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IPD Schedule and Cost Study Context
Historically, some NASA missions have exceeded schedule and cost commitments.
In 1980, The NASA Project Management Study concluded, “one of the most 
significant contributors to cost and schedule growth is inadequate definition of 
technical and management aspects of a program…” (cited in GAO/NSIAD-93-97, p. 11).
In 1992, The NASA Program Costs Report stated that NASA officials identified, 
among other things, “program and funding instability, overly optimistic 
assumptions by program officials, and unrealistic contractor estimates” as reasons 
why initial estimates changed over time (GAO/NSIAD-93-97, p. 11).
In 2002, The Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs was 
chartered to review the acquisition of national security space programs, identify 
and characterize systemic problems and recommend improvements. The Task 
Force report is a Defense Science Board publication, May 2003. Findings follow.Robbins/Schmidt/White February 2020 2
IPD Schedule and Cost Study Context (continued)
The Task Force report (2003) identified five reasons for schedule and cost growth. Two of 
the five directly cite cost or cost estimates (p.2):
• “Cost has replaced mission success as the primary driver in managing space 
development programs … [resulting] … in excessive technical and schedule risk.”
• “Unrealistic estimates lead to unrealistic budgets and unexecutable programs. The space 
acquisition system is strongly biased to produce unrealistically low cost estimates 
throughout the acquisition process.” 
Additionally, the report identified ”unhealthy cost bias in proposal evaluation, widespread 
lack of budget reserves required to implement high risk programs on schedule, and an 
overall underappreciation of the importance of appropriately staffed and trained system 
engineering staffs to manage the technologically demanding and unique aspects of space 
programs” (p.i).
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IPD Schedule and Cost Study Context (continued)
In 2007, The NASA Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE) chartered the NASA Instrument 
Capability Study (NICS).
“to determine whether NASA instrument developers are facing challenges that impact 
the capability to design and build quality instruments or whether there are flaws in the 
acquisition strategy evidenced by schedule delays, cost overruns, and increased 
technical risk via design deficiencies. The … team was also chartered to determine if 
occurrences [are] … isolated cases or if there [are] generic issues … If the issues [are] 
found to be generic, the team [is] to offer solutions to recover such capability.” (NICS 
Report, 2008, p. vi).
The NICS Report (2008) identified challenges to instrument schedule and cost growth 
consistent with previous findings.
In 2017, Using the NICS as a guide, the Instrument Projects Division (IPD) initiated the 
Schedule and Cost Study to determine if there was a change in meeting schedule and 
cost commitments after implementing certain NICS recommendations. If not, “Why?”
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IPD Schedule and Cost Study Problem Statement
Historically, some NASA GSFC scientific instruments have exceeded schedule and cost commitments.
Research Questions
RQ1) Is the IPD implementing NICS Finding 1 recommendations, Finding 2 recommendation 3, and 
Finding 5 recommendation 1?  RQ1a) To what degree are instrument projects aligning with NICS 
recommendations? (NICS recommendations are presented on slides 12-16)
RQ2) At Commissioning, are at least 80% (TBR) of IPD managed instruments meeting CSR/Directed 
Study schedule and budget with margins (S&B) estimates and/or PDR S&B commitments? RQ2a) 
What is the relationship between IPD managed instruments and meeting CSR/ Directed Study S&B? 
RQ2b) What is the relationship between IPD managed instruments and meeting PDR S&B?
RQ3) Is the Center-level investment sufficient for at least 80% (TBR) of IPD managed instruments to 
meet Study S&B? RQ3a) Is the Center-level investment sufficient for at least 80% (TBR) of managed 
instruments to meet PDR S&B? Center-level investment is defined as existence of IPD, supported by 
resource-level CM&O and Directorate funds.
RQ4) Is there a relationship between meeting NASA scientific instrument technical success and 
meeting schedule and budget commitments? RQ4a) If yes, what is the relationship?
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IPD Schedule and Cost Study Objectives
Desired results
• Determine if at least 80% (TBR) of IPD managed instrument projects meet Study S&B.
• Determine if at least 80% (TBR) of IPD managed instrument projects meet PDR S&B.
• Determine if Center-level commitment is sufficient for at least 80% (TBR) of IPD managed 
instruments to meet Study S&B.
• Determine if Center-level commitment is sufficient for at least 80% (TBR) of IPD managed 
instruments to meet PDR S&B.
• Determine if there was a change in meeting schedule and cost commitments after implementing 
certain NICS recommendations.
• Determine if there is a relationship between instrument technical success and meeting schedule 
and cost commitments.
Definitions/ methods
• Success is defined as at least 80% (TBR) of IPD managed instrument projects meet Study S&B 
and/or PDR S&B. Success is tracked as costs variance and schedule variance using CSR/Directed 
Study as the starting point and PDR as the S&B commitment. To meet S&B, an instrument must 
deliver on or before the agreed to delivery date,  and at or below agreed to cost at the end of 
commissioning. Robbins/Schmidt/White February 2020 6
IPD Schedule and Cost Study Logic Model excerpt 
09.17.19
Inputs Activities Outputs
Level 3 Outcome
Level 2 
Outcome Level 1 Outcome CSR/Directe
d Study SRR PDR CDR Delivery Commissioning
Authority to 
direct 
personnel to 
cooperate and 
respond to 
Study
Space on 
TDMS
WYE (TDMS, 
data 
collection,
analysis, 
survey
management 
report 
preparation)
FTE (allocate 
resources to 
IPMs to 
complete 
survey, 
cooperate with
investigation)
Python and 
modules
Adobe 
Acrobat pro
Survey 
Monkey
1) Capture budget 
and schedule data 
at time of CSR/ 
Directed Study, 
SRR, PDR, CDR, 
Delivery, and 
Commissioning
2) Analyze 
collected data 
using NICs report 
as control/ 
baseline: “~70% of 
the instruments 
reported 25% or 
more cost overruns 
and ~60% of the 
instruments 
reported schedule 
delays of 5 months 
or more.” NICS 
report 12 2008 
[NP-2008-11-058-
GSFC] p.51
3) Generate 
report(s) to include 
presentation-level 
summaries 
1) Analyzed 
data. 
Analyses 
reflect types of 
data collected
2) Reports. 
Reports 
include data 
summaries, 
visualizations, 
recommendati
ons and 
presentation-
level 
summaries 
Start = CSR/ 
Directed Study 
Schedule and 
budget with 
margins (S&B) 
from 
CSR/Directed 
Study define 
starting point. 
The starting 
point is the 
“estimate” or 
Study S&B
O1) At SRR, 
instrument 
meets Study 
S&B
To meet S&B, 
an instrument 
must deliver on 
or before the 
agreed to 
delivery date,  
and at or 
below agreed 
to cost at the 
end of 
commissioning
Q1) At SRR 
are we meeting 
the Study 
S&B? If not, 
what are the 
variances? 
Why? 
Commitment 
= PDR S&B
O1) At PDR, 
instrument
meets SRR
S&B
O2) At PDR, 
instrument 
meets Study 
S&B
Q1) At PDR 
are we 
meeting  SRR 
S&B? If not, 
what are the 
variances? 
Why? 
Q2) At PDR 
are we 
meeting the 
Study S&B? If 
not, what are 
the 
variances? 
Why? 
O1) At CDR, 
instrument
meets PDR 
S&B
O2) At CDR, 
instrument 
meets Study 
S&B
Q1) At CDR 
are we 
meeting PDR 
S&B? If not, 
what are the 
variances? 
Why? 
Q2) At CDR 
are we 
meeting Study 
S&B? If not, 
what are the 
variances? 
Why? 
O1) At Delivery, 
instrument meets 
CDR S&B
O2) At Delivery, 
instrument meets 
PDR S&B
O3) At Delivery, 
instrument meets 
Study S&B
Q1) At Delivery 
are we meeting 
CDR S&B? If not, 
what are the 
variances? Why?
Q2) At Delivery 
are we meeting 
PDR S&B? If not, 
what are the 
variances? Why?
Q3) At Delivery 
are we meeting  
the Study S&B? 
If not, what are 
the variances? 
Why? 
O1) At 
Commissioning, 
instrument meets 
Delivery S&B
O2) At 
Commissioning, 
instrument meets 
PDR S&B
O3) At 
Commissioning, 
instrument meets 
Study S&B
Q1) At 
Commissioning are 
we meeting Delivery 
S&B? If not, what are 
the variances? Why?
Q2) At 
Commissioning are 
we meeting PDR 
S&B? If not, what are 
the variances? Why?
Q3) At 
Commissioning are 
we meeting the Study 
SBE? If not, what are 
the variances? Why?
O1) Individual 
instruments 
implement NICS 
Finding 1 recs, 
Finding 2 rec 3, 
Finding 5 rec 1
O2) Individual 
instruments meet 
PDR S&B
O3) Individual 
instruments meet 
Study S&B
Q1) Have individual 
instruments 
implemented NICS 
Finding 1 recs, 
Finding 2 rec 3, and 
Finding 5 rec 1? If 
not, why?  
Q2) Have individual 
instruments met 
Study S&B? If not, 
why? 
Q3) Have individual 
instruments met PDR  
S&B? If not, why? 
O1) IPD managed instruments implement 
NICS Finding 1 recs, Finding 2 rec 3, 
Finding 5 rec 1
O2) At least 80% (TBR) of IPD managed 
instruments meet Study S&B. 
O3) At least 80% (TBR) of IPD managed 
instruments meet PDR S&B 
O4) Center-level investment is sufficient for 
at least 80% (TBR) of IPD managed 
instruments to meet Study S&B 
O5) Center-level investment is sufficient for 
at least 80% (TBR) of IPD managed 
instruments to meet PDR S&B
Q1) Have IPD managed instruments 
implemented NICS Finding 1 recs, Finding 2 
rec 3, Finding 5 rec 1? If not, what action(s) 
does IPD need to take to implement 
findings?
Q2) Have at least 80% (TBR) of IPD
managed instruments met Study S&B? If 
not, what action(s) does IPD need to take to 
improve instrument performance?
Q3) Have at least 80% (TBR) of IPD
managed instruments met PDR S&B? If not, 
what action(s) does IPD need to take to 
improve instrument performance?
Q3) Are Center-level resources sufficient for 
at least 80% (TBR) of IPD managed 
instruments to meet Study S&B? If not, how 
much more Center investment is needed?
Q3) Are Center-level resources sufficient for 
at least 80% (TBR) of IPD managed 
instruments to meet PDR S&B? If not, how 
much more Center investment is needed?
Robbins/Schmidt/White February 2020 7
NICS Charter, Objectives,  
Recommendations, Future Steps 
NICS Charter (July 2007) – to determine whether 
• “NASA instrument developers are facing challenges that impact the 
capability to design and build quality instruments… or …
• flaws in the acquisition strategy [are] evidenced by schedule delays, 
cost overruns, and increased technical risk via design deficiencies” 
[and]
• “[Recent] occurrences are coincident, but isolated cases or if generic 
issues [are] causing this degradation.” (NICS Report (2008) p.vi)
NICS team included GSFC (lead), NOAA and DOD (participants)
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NICS Objectives (NICS Report, 2008, p. vi) – to 
• Understand problem areas in instrument development processes 
• Determine problem areas impacting primary success indicators 
(cost, schedule, technical performance) and instrument 
development processes
• Identify potential issues for higher risk or more complex instrument 
developments
• Identify common overarching themes spanning instrument 
development processes
• Recommend solutions
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NICS Approach (NICS Report, 2008, p. vii)
Implement a top-level assessment of instrument development 
processes and success indicators for
• Instruments roughly $10m to more than $100m
• Time frame 3 to more than 6 years
Used two surveys, cross-referenced with research
• Instrument Survey n = 71 Instrument Managers, 41 instruments
• General Workforce Survey n = 164 invited civil servants &  contractors, and 
volunteer participants from industry & academia 
• Independent research: NASA/ Federal/ RAND publications, lessons learned, 
SpaceNews (NICS Report, 2008, p.60)
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NICS Finding 1 and Recommended Actions 
Finding 1 Recommended Actions Rationale
1. Implement changes to policy to define and elevate 
instrument management requirements and authorities in a 
manner similar to project-level management.
2. Assign NASA instrument managers full authority and 
responsibility to manage their cost and schedule reserves 
and hold them accountable.
3. Require 30% to 50% cost reserves for instrument 
developments (>$10M) to account for the fact that most 
instrument developments are highly complex, single builds.
4. Require 1-1/2 to 2 months per year of schedule
reserve for instrument developments (>$10M).
5. Require dedicated level of support staff
(configuration management, schedule management, risk 
management and budget management) for instrument 
developments (>$10M). 
Instrument developments are uniquely complex, often one-
of-a-kind, and, as such, require a higher level of visibility, 
authority, and support than normal spacecraft subsystems.
Transition of authority to the lower levels is necessary to 
permit informed management and mitigation of risks before 
they turn into more expensive problems.
The typical rule of thumb of 25% cost reserve and 1 month 
per year schedule reserve does not appear to be sufficient 
for instrument developments. This is corroborated by the 
data which indicated that ~70% of the instruments reported 
25% or more cost overruns and ~60% of the instruments 
reported schedule delays of 5 months or more.
Finding 1: Instrument developments lack resources and authority to successfully manage to 
cost and schedule requirements  (NICS Report, 2008, p.51)
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NICS Finding 2 and Recommended Actions 
Finding 2 Recommended Actions Rationale
1. Expedite the planned enhancement of the NASA 
Engineering Network People, Organization, Project, Skills 
(POPS) expertise locator to enable
instruments to address critical skills shortages by
drawing upon personnel from other NASA centers.
2. Add capability to the POPS locator to include data 
sources external to the NASA workforce.
3. Require the addition of a deputy instrument
manager position (similar to a deputy project
manager), for instrument developments with a
budget >$10M. 
Expediting the POPS expertise locator enhancement will 
allow instrument projects to locate critical skills in the near-
term mitigating staffing issues, which is one of the top five 
problems reported in this Study. POPS allows instruments to 
draw from a wider pool of potential expertise.
Given the complexity and scope of instrument 
developments, the addition of a deputy instrument manager 
position is warranted. This position creates a mechanism for 
transfer of corporate knowledge, training and mentoring, 
and provides critical support to the instrument manager. 
Finally, it ensures continuity, should leadership transitions 
occur. 
Finding 2: Instrument developments lack critical skills, expertise or leadership to successfully 
implement these unique (one-of-a-kind) high technology developments (NICS Report, 2008, p.52)
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NICS Finding 3 and Recommended Actions 
Finding 3 Recommended Actions Rationale
1. Require NASA instrument team leadership to take 
requirements formulation/management training, e.g., 
“Requirements Development and Management (APPEL-
REQ)”, prior to requirements development.
2. Require instrument teams to conduct Peer Reviews of 
requirements (for each instrument subsystem), in 
preparation for instrument SRRs.
3. Require draft mission Level 1 and 2 technical 
requirements to be controlled and provided to instrument 
managers prior to the instrument SRR. Also, notify 
instrument managers of any changes to the draft 
requirements so that impact assessments can be 
performed. 
In order to fix the requirements problems reported in the 
Study, a wide range of recommendations should be 
implemented. These recommendations include a greater 
emphasis on training to provide instrument teams a better 
understanding of how to formulate and manage 
requirements. The recommendations also provide an 
improved requirements review process to account for the 
fact that instrument SRRs occur much earlier than mission 
SRRs which often leads to requirements changes, as well as 
traceability issues. Finally, a recommendation is added to 
provide instruments with top level requirements early in 
formulation to allow for a more thorough requirements 
development and management process. 
Finding 3: There are significant process problems in the area of requirements formulation, 
reviews, and management (NICS Report, 2008, pp.52-53)
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NICS Finding 4 and Recommended Actions 
Finding 4 Recommended Actions Rationale
1. Develop an Agency-level historical cost and schedule 
database of instruments to provide information that would 
allow for higher fidelity cost caps.
2. Review cost credibility evaluation and scoring criteria for 
accuracy and flow-down to the proposal selection process 
(for use by Technical Management and Cost (TMC) or 
project Source Evaluation Board (SEB)).
3. Establish a Peer Review prior to PDR for instruments 
>$10M to assess budget and schedule baseline credibility 
and increase the emphasis on cost and schedule assessment 
at PDR.
4. Ensure that instrument managers are made aware of 
externally driven changes in a timely manner and afforded 
the opportunity to discuss any impacts prior to 
implementation of changes. 
The costing database will be useful in: establishing higher 
fidelity cost caps; evaluating government and contractor 
instrument proposals; and assessing progress during 
implementation. Furthermore, a data exchange between 
NASA, NOAA, and DoD on instrument development cost data 
would allow for a more thorough data set.  
Improved cost credibility criteria support a more robust and 
thorough source selection. 
Adding a budget and schedule baseline credibility Peer 
Review prior to PDR will increase confidence going in to the 
Confirmation Review. 
Early communication of externally driven changes (e.g., 
budget or schedule changes) down to the instrument level 
minimizes the impact to the instrument development. 
Finding 4: Unrealistic caps, overly optimistic estimating, externally directed changes correspond to 
a significant increase in the likelihood of overrunning cost, schedule (NICS Report,2008, pp.53-54)
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NICS Finding 5 and Recommended Actions 
Finding 5 Recommended Actions Rationale
1. Require all instrument managers to take the survey upon 
delivery of their instrument.
2. Maintain survey results in a historical database. 
The aggregated data could provide the Agency information 
regarding trends, persistent issues, and emerging issues. 
Finding 5: NASA needs a method to continue answering basic questions pertaining to instrument 
development process to identify any emerging or persistent issues (NICS Report,2008, p.54)
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